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Summary 
What happenned after 2007 requires that new kind of instruments applied in order to 
face the global financial crisis. Non-coordinated actions undertaken by a single bank group 
have additionally sharpened the effects of the crisis and have resulted in the must of joint 
efforts which are better known as the "prisoner's dilemma". 
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Introduction 
EU enlargement to the Eastern Europe celebrated its first decade. Regardless of the 
processes of economic integration, the financial system continues to be determined by the 
complex relationships between countries: the economically developed countries take 
advantage of the benefits offered by their advantages and provide free financial resources for 
lending to other economies.  
Economists believe that the modern financial system has to be restructured in a new 
framework. Individual interests must give way to collective actions. The new instruments are 
based on the application of game theory. Given the convergence of national differences in 
current practice most often used open-ended games. Great application is being applicable the 
"prisoner's dilemma" in which one participant can win/lose, all can win or all can lose.  
 
In the early twenty-first century the economic development in the EU grew thanks to 
the accession of countries from Eastern Europe. Foreign banks were providing know-how, 
stabilizing funds and large volume credits. On the other hand, foreign banks incurred capital 
repatriation. From the standpoint of the prisoner's dilemma, all participants reach a collective 
benefit.  
Besides the positive effects of the convergence of Eastern Europe through external 
financing, the large capital flows led to overheating economies and macroeconomic 
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imbalances1. In 2009, the banking system in Romania fell into difficulties, which led to the 
withdrawal of funds from banking groups to reduce risk and meet the heightened 
requirements of national supervisory authorities. The interests of bank managers and the 
supervisory authorities of the home country coincided in funds withdrawing to protect their 
own banks. The ensuing chain reaction caused some uncertainty as to the countries of Eastern 
Europe and in other Member States.  
Under normal conditions, the interests of local stakeholders and foreign banks were 
leveled by the benefits of efficient, profitable and stable banking sector2. During the crisis, 
short-term interests began to diverge, as parent banks sought to minimize potential losses and 
local stakeholders were concerned to ensure a steady flow of credit and to increase tax 
revenues. Such conflict of interests put governments and foreign banks in a situation known 
as the prisoner's dilemma: a banking group, which first withdraw its financial capital of 
Eastern Europe, will face lower losses than those who remain bound for a longer period of 
time because invested funds for the construction of a network of retail banking. 
The taken actions aimed to stabilize the financial situation of a particular banking 
group without taking into account the adverse effects on the economies of Eastern Europe and 
other banking groups. Notwithstanding the diversity of actions, they can be grouped as 
follows: 
- parent banks withdraw their own funds from Eastern Europe to strengthen the 
operations of the domestic markets; 
- packages of loans granted by the IMF to economies of Eastern Europe are transferred 
to the country of the parent bank; 
- selling of assets to improve the adequacy of core capital and reduction of risk due to 
regulatory pressure to increase capital buffers, the introduction of the IRB model and the 
supervisory authority of the home state to expand to overseas subsidiaries the prohibition of 
allocating local exposures to the parent bank.  
 
To reduce the uncertainty caused by the withdrawal of funds be required to approach 
"country-by-country". It requires coordination between the competent authorities of the home 
country and the host country, but also between parent banks and their overseas subsidiaries.  
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The pan-European policy for financial stability necessary to establish an initiative to 
coordinate actions. In 2010, under the auspices of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development in Vienna held a meeting to decide "prisoner's dilemma"3.  
The main participants in the Vienna Initiative are: 
- international economic organizations (International Monetary Fund, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank and the World Bank, with 
the leading role of the EBRD); 
- European institutions (European Commission and European Central Bank as an 
observer); 
- regulatory authorities of the home country (Austria, Belgium, Greece, France and 
Italy) and the host country (Hungary, Romania, Latvia and Serbia); 
- large banking groups operating in the region of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EFG, Erste, Intesa, KBC, Piraeus Bank, Raiffeisen 
International, Societe Generale and Unicredit). 
The goals that were set before the Vienna Initiative are: 
- limiting large volume and uncoordinated withdrawals from cross-border banking 
groups in Eastern Europe, not to trigger systemic risks both for individual country and for the 
EU as a whole; 
- public commitment of parent banks to maintain their exposure to their subsidiaries 
and to recapitalize them; 
- conducting liquidity measures by the local central banks; 
- local governments commit not to carry out capital controls. 
 
Coordination of actions undertaken led to the success of the Vienna initiative and 
Eastern Europe do not saw a large outflow of capital. The emerging second wave of the 
financial crisis, associated with the debt crisis in the eurozone, had a negative effect on the 
economies of the EU, which were not recovered. That is why we need to start a new initiative 
called "Vienna 2.0". According to Vienna 2.0 the parent banks undertake to maintain stable 
debt levels in countries that receive aid from the International Monetary Fund. 
The interests of the parent banks and supervisory authorities of the home country 
coincided. The threat was explained by the fact that Western countries rush to protect 
themselves from the debt crisis, and banks will reduce costs and activity and it would be a 
double blow to the economies of Eastern Europe. To all interested parties, it became clear that 
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if one of the banks leave, others will follow and the situation will worsen for all banks4. If all 
remain on the market, the situation will keep stable. 
 
The new initiative aims to reduce credit exposures of the subsidiaries of Austrian 
banks in Eastern Europe5. To deal with the most urgent problems, the guiding principles 
require Austrian banks, having business in these countries, to suspend the granting of new 
loans in currencies other than euros of unhedged households and small and medium 
enterprises. 
The systemic risks in 2010 changed the focus of the use of local currency and the 
development of local capital markets, management of non-performing loans and assessing the 
impact of Basel III on Eastern Europe6. The new initiative is aimed at slowing the pace of 
withdrawal of capital and avoid a crisis in the provision of financing in Eastern Europe than to 
hold investments there. The measures are aimed less at parent banks that have subsidiaries in 
the 10 new EU Member States and more to regulators and the subsidiaries themselves.  
 
Conclusion 
The Vienna Initiative is a framework for coordinated crisis management between EU-
based cross-border banking groups in Eastern Europe7. It redefined from crisis management to 
crisis prevention. In resolving the prisoner's dilemma are involved stakeholders from the 
public and private sectors. The EBRD, using unique relationships with both the private sector 
and governments, promotes the transition and development in the private sector.  
The pan-European co-ordinated policy was in response to the first shocks and limit 
uncoordinated national responses to the negative effects of transition from crisis. The Vienna 
Initiative provide 24.5 billion Euros to support the financial sector in Eastern Europe through 
credit lines for financing the recapitalization of banks, development of credit policy to support 
financial sector reforms. The final result in the countries of Eastern Europe the foreign banks 
have a leading position and their subsidiary banks continue to have stable credit sources8.  
 
The effects of the Vienna initiative changed the best corporate governance practices. 
Traditional participants perform new roles. The shareholder composition is expanded to 
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include government institutions as majority shareholder, which found application of the 
continental agency conflict between majority shareholder and investors. The Managers have 
an increased responsibility for information disclosure on the use of state aid. The auditors are 
subject to supervision by the home state and only carry out audit services only, the consulting 
services was separated in a specialized company. The regulators substitute the general 
meeting of shareholders and actively participate in the exercise of control by exercising the 
voting right. The tools have been upgraded from reaching the national competitiveness and 
interests of banking groups to achieve macroeconomic stability and protect the interests of 
society. 
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